The debate around the proposed Higher Education Commission of India Bill arrives at a pivotal moment in India's constitutional evolution and its struggle to balance national standardisation with federal autonomy. Education in India has historically reflected this tension. From the transfer of education to the Concurrent List through the Forty-second Constitutional Amendment in 1976 to the long-standing dual structure involving the Union and the states, every major reform has required careful navigation of constitutional provisions, federal sensitivities and the accumulated realities of India's vast and heterogeneous higher education ecosystem. The current debate is far more than a contest over regulatory architecture. It is a direct encounter with fundamental questions about the limits of central authority, the distribution of powers in a federal union, the role of ideology in public institutions, and the future of public-funded higher education.
To evaluate the proposed restructuring intelligently, one must ground the analysis in the Constitution itself. The Seventh Schedule places higher education in the Concurrent List through Entry 25 of List III. This allows both Parliament and state legislatures to legislate on universities, technical and medical education and educational standards. Entry 66 of the Union List gives Parliament exclusive authority over coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education and research. Articles 245 and 246 clarify that Union law prevails over state law in case of conflict unless the state law has received Presidential assent, and even then Parliament may override it later. This creates a clear but delicate constitutional balance. Parliament has unquestioned authority to set standards, create national regulators and legislate for coordination. States, however, retain authority over the creation, administration, funding and internal governance of their universities. The Supreme Court has affirmed this balance repeatedly. In the landmark T M A Pai Foundation judgment and its later clarifications, the Court held that while standards can be set centrally, universities require operational and academic autonomy, and state-level diversity of institutions and governance structures is justified in a vast country. Earlier judgments such as Gujarat University vs Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar underscored that coordination of standards cannot be equated with complete centralisation of control.
It is against this constitutional backdrop that the Higher Education Commission of India proposal must be assessed. The 2018 draft Bill, which is widely understood to be the basis of the forthcoming legislation, sought to repeal the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and to replace the UGC with a three-part commission involving regulatory oversight, quality assurance and academic standards. Its most significant provisions were not the structural ones. They were the clauses empowering the Commission to issue binding directions to universities on matters deemed to be of national importance, the near-complete elimination of the UGC's grant-giving role, and the concentration of appointment powers within search committees designed and controlled by the central government. When these powers are combined with the already expansive authority of the Union under Entry 66, the resulting framework creates a gravitational pull toward regulatory centralisation that could reshape India's higher education landscape for decades.
Several Standing Committee reports and parliamentary debates over the past two decades have anticipated these tensions. The 2009 Yash Pal Committee report on higher education warned that without clear safeguards, a single regulator could become an instrument of political influence rather than a guardian of academic quality. The National Knowledge Commission similarly cautioned against excessive central control and recommended independent, multi-stakeholder regulatory bodies insulated from executive interference. Parliamentary debates in 2011 and 2012 over the Higher Education and Research Bill revealed bipartisan concerns about the erosion of state roles in higher education if appointment, rule-making and funding powers were centralised. Committees repeatedly noted that universities must retain autonomy in curriculum, recruitment, academic structure and internal governance if they are to function as genuine knowledge institutions rather than administrative extensions of ministries.
These concerns must be contextualised with empirical realities of Indian higher education. According to the latest All India Survey on Higher Education, India has more than 1,100 universities and over 43,000 colleges. Nearly 78 percent of students study in state public universities and their affiliated colleges, while centrally funded institutions account for roughly 3 percent of enrolment. Gross enrolment ratio has risen steadily to around 28 percent, but this growth is highly uneven. States such as Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh have GERs above 45 percent, while several states in the north and east remain below 20 percent. Funding patterns are equally uneven. State universities depend overwhelmingly on state budgets, and many operate under severe financial distress. A national regulator that exercises binding authority without parallel mechanisms for funding, capacity building and state participation risks deepening these imbalances rather than correcting them.
It is important to recognise the strengths that proponents of centralisation point to. India's regulatory structure is undeniably fragmented. The UGC, AICTE, NCTE and other bodies operate with overlapping jurisdictions, inconsistent processes and uneven enforcement capacity. Many private institutions emerged in regulatory grey zones. Affiliation systems remain over-burdened and slow. Quality assurance mechanisms have not kept pace with rapid expansion. NEP 2020's vision of a unified regulatory architecture seeks to address these problems by simplifying processes, enabling multidisciplinary universities, promoting mobility through the Academic Bank of Credits and ensuring uniform minimum standards. These objectives are legitimate. Countries with strong higher education systems often combine decentralised institutional autonomy with national-level quality frameworks. The UK uses the Office for Students and national Research Excellence Framework, but universities enjoy significant internal autonomy. Australia and Canada have national quality agencies but provincial responsibility for institutions. Germany allows extensive state control but maintains national research coordination. These examples show that national frameworks can be compatible with autonomy if governance design prevents capture and concentrates on evaluation rather than control.
The challenge is that India's proposed model risks going further than standardisation. A regulator that removes grant-making functions but retains power to impose binding directions creates a structural dependency on the Union executive. Appointment mechanisms without transparent, multi-stakeholder representation risk reducing the regulator's independence. This becomes even more sensitive when placed in a political context. Over the past decade, several central university vice chancellors have been appointed from ideologically aligned academic backgrounds. While political influence in appointments is not unique to one government or to India, the creation of a centralised regulator multiplies the possibilities for system-wide ideological imprinting. Even if the draft HECI Bill does not explicitly mention any ideological organisation, the design of its appointment and directive powers is sufficient to create pathways for ideological influence, whether of the present political ecosystem or any future one. Federal structure is not protected merely by constitutional lists but by institutional design that ensures pluralism in appointments and decision-making.
Additionally, the removal of UGC grants and the separation of funding into the hands of the Ministry of Education raises a fundamental governance question. Regulators and funders are ideally separated only when the regulator has strong independence and the funder operates through transparent, rule-bound financing processes. In a system where the ministry controls both fund flows and appointments to the regulator, the result can be a vertically integrated control mechanism rather than an autonomous, evaluative regulator. This can undermine the spirit of Entry 66, which is intended to ensure standards, not to run universities through centralised administrative control.
There are also implications for technical and professional education. AICTE, which currently regulates technical institutions and engineering colleges, has developed longstanding norms, industry-linked accreditation models and interactions with professional bodies. Folding its functions into a single regulator may simplify procedures but risks losing sector-specific expertise unless the new structure preserves strong technical councils. Technical education is closely tied to industry, research ecosystems and employability. Regulatory structures must therefore remain permeable to industry expertise and not become overly centralised or pedagogically rigid.
While recognising the potential benefits of simplification and standardisation, the risks of centralisation must be articulated clearly. The most serious concerns relate to federal erosion, academic autonomy and diversity. A one-size-fits-all national model risks flattening linguistic, cultural and regional variations that have historically enriched Indian higher education. Centralised prescription can reduce space for experimentation, innovation and locally responsive curricula. Public universities, which already operate with financial constraints, may find themselves adhering to centrally mandated compliance regimes without receiving corresponding funding support. This could deepen the existing divide between elite institutions and the mass public university system.
The reforms therefore require clear safeguards. Regulatory architecture must ensure transparent and pluralistic appointment processes that include state nominees, judicial representation and independent academic experts. Binding directive powers must be constrained through statutory definitions, parliamentary oversight and review mechanisms. Accreditation must involve independent, multi-stakeholder bodies insulated from executive control. Funding frameworks must be strengthened so that public universities are not left without adequate support. Federal consultation must be institutionalised through intergovernmental councils. Without these safeguards, the structural risks of the proposed Bill will outweigh its potential benefits, and the long-term effects on Indian higher education may be difficult to reverse.
In conclusion, India stands at a crossroads. The proposed HECI framework could help rationalise regulation, modernise academic structures and improve quality if built on transparent, federal and autonomous foundations. It could equally produce unprecedented centralisation, weakened states, ideological capture and fragile public universities if designed without sufficient checks. Constitutional provisions permit national coordination but do not license absolute central control. Federalism, academic freedom and institutional diversity are not procedural preferences but essential conditions for a robust knowledge society. The design of the forthcoming Bill will determine whether India's higher education system moves toward a more coordinated and modern future or toward a more centralised and politically influenced structure. The debate is therefore not merely administrative. It is a test of India's constitutional spirit, its federal equilibrium and its long-term educational vision.
[Major General Dr. Dilawar Singh, IAV, is a distinguished strategist having held senior positions in technology, defence, and corporate governance. He serves on global boards and advises on leadership, emerging technologies, and strategic affairs, with a focus on aligning India's interests in the evolving global technological order.]
